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THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM OF
DISCHARGE ARBITRATION OUTCOMES
AND REMEDIES: FACT OR FICTION
Mario F. Bognanno, Jonathan E. Booth, Thomas J. Norman,
Laura J. Cooper, and Stephen F. Befort*
ABSTRACT
This study examines some of the arbitration community’s commonly
accepted beliefs about arbitration outcomes and remedies in em-
ployee discharge cases, with the findings revealing that some beliefs
are likely fact, while others, perhaps, are fiction.  With data from
1432 Minnesota discharge awards and 74 arbitrators who decided
them, eight truisms are examined pertaining to the following: the fre-
quency that arbitrators use Daugherty’s Seven Tests rubric to ana-
lyze case evidence and whether its use affects award outcomes; the
distribution of varying quanta of required proof by arbitrators and
how different quanta affects award outcomes; and the effect of em-
ployee job tenure and “last chance agreement” status on award out-
comes.  Using a subsample of “reinstatement with back pay”
awards, we additionally examine the prevalence of arbitrators order-
ing how back pay should be computed and “retaining jurisdiction”
over back pay cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Grievance arbitration is almost universal in the unionized sec-
tor of the United States.  The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics re-
ported that, in 2011, nearly 16.3 million employed workers were
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covered by collective bargaining agreements.1  The vast majority of
covered workers have the right to challenge employer decisions af-
fecting contractual matters, including the right to bring discharge
and discipline, or simply “just cause” grievances, before a neutral
arbitrator for final resolution.2  Further, data published by the Fed-
eral Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) show that just
cause grievances constitute a plurality of all grievance arbitration
cases decided annually.3  Records are not maintained on the num-
ber of just cause grievances heard annually in the United States,
but a realistic estimate puts that number at about 20,000.4
The literature on grievance arbitration, its origins, legal foun-
dation, and processes is large.5  However, just cause grievance arbi-
tration outcomes have not received as much attention from
scholars.  Thus, this study takes a step toward filling this informa-
tion gap, as it relates specifically to discharge grievances.  We have
compiled a dataset based on 1432 discharge awards and the 74 arbi-
trators who decided them.  Our dataset includes variables that are
mainly coded categorical information about how the arbitrators de-
cided each discharge case (i.e., the employer wins, nearly wins,
nearly loses, or loses), and such additional details with which to test
our hypotheses.
This study’s purpose is to investigate the validity of some of
the arbitration community’s commonly held beliefs about em-
1 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat40.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 1, 2012).
2 One survey found that 92% of collective bargaining agreements permitted employers to
discharge or discipline employees only for “just cause” or “cause.” See BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS, at 7 (14th ed. 1995).  Also, arbitrators and the
courts consider protection from unjust dismissal so integral to the collective bargaining relation-
ship that they find this requirement exists even in contracts that do not contain an explicit “just
cause” provision. See, e.g., In re Superior Products, 116 LAB. ARB. REP. 1623 (Hockenberry,
2002); SFIC Properties, Inc. v. Machinists, District Lodge 94, 103 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 1996).
3 The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service reported that just cause grievance arbitra-
tions constituted approximately 40% of all cases arbitrated in Fiscal Year 2009. The next largest
category, wage disputes, represented about 5.4% of cases. See http://fmcs.gov/assets/files/Arbi
tration/FY%202009%20Statistics/Issues_Arbitrated.doc.
4 CHARLES J. COLEMAN, THE ARBITRATOR’S CASES: NUMBER, SOURCES, ISSUES, AND IM-
PLICATIONS, LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA: THE PROFESSION AND PRACTICE (M. F.
Bognanno & C. J. Coleman, eds., 1992).
5 See, e.g., NORMAN BRAND, DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE IN ARBITRATION (Norman Brand
et al. eds., 1998); LAURA J. COOPER, DENNIS R. NOLAN, RICHARD A. BALES & STEPHEN F.
BEFORT, ADR IN THE WORKPLACE (3d ed. 2014); FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI,
HOW ARBITRATION WORKS (6th ed. 2003); OWEN FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
IN LABOR ARBITRATION (2d ed. 1983); ROBBEN W. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PRO-
CESS (1965); ADOLPH M. KOVEN & SUSAN L. SMITH, JUST CAUSE: THE SEVEN TESTS (2d ed.
1998).
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ployee discharge arbitration cases, their outcomes and their reme-
dies.  Since conventional wisdom, by definition, is not necessarily
true, the study’s overarching research question encompasses
whether the identified aspects of perceived truths in discharge arbi-
tration are more so fact or fiction.  We specifically investigate con-
ventional beliefs and inference hypotheses regarding: (1)
arbitrators use of Carroll R. Daugherty’s Seven Tests rubric to ana-
lyze the evidentiary record of discharge cases and whether doing so
affects the decisions that they render;6 (2) the quantum of proof
that arbitrators require in deciding discharge cases and whether re-
quiring more stringent quanta impacts their discharge outcomes;
(3) the influence of “last chance agreements” on arbitrator deci-
sions; and (4) the impact of the grievant’s job tenure on decisional
outcomes.
Additionally, we have identified a sub-sample of discharge
cases in which the arbitrator determined that the employer did not
have just cause to discharge the grievant, and, as a remedy, ordered
the grievant’s reinstatement with either full or partial back pay.
Using this sub-sample, we test the conventional propositions that
arbitrators are likely to retain post-award jurisdiction over such
cases and to issue remedial orders identifying the specific deduc-
tions that are to be made in calculating the amount of back pay
that the grievant should receive.
II. PREVIOUS LITERATURE
The just cause arbitration literature includes field and experi-
mental studies that evaluate the effects of several variables on
award outcomes.  The constructs previously investigated are clus-
tered under three categories, which include: arbitrator, grievant,
and arbitration case characteristics.  Scholars generally have shown
these characteristics to correlate with just cause grievance arbitra-
tion outcomes.  From a review of the literature, the arbitrator char-
acteristics that have been investigated are the arbitrator’s gender,
age, experience, National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA) mem-
bership,7 education, and occupation.8  The grievant characteristics
6 Enterprise Wheel Co., 46 LA 359, 362 (Carroll R. Daugherty, 1966); Grief Bros. Cooper-
age Corp., 42 LA 555, 557-59 (Carroll R. Daugherty, 1964).
7 The present study’s proxy for “experience” is membership in the NAA.  Throughout the
study’s sampling period, membership in the NAA required the applicants to have heard and
decided at least fifty binding union-management awards within the previous five years.  In 2008,
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explored in the literature as influencing just cause arbitration out-
comes are the grievant’s gender, grievant and arbitrator gender
match, and the grievant’s tenure.9  Finally, previous studies have
focused on such arbitration case characteristics as sector, the par-
ties’ use of attorney representatives, the time delay between the
date of the disciplinary action and the date that the arbitration
award was rendered, as well as the type of offense being arbi-
trated.10  Our dataset includes measures of these variables, and,
when appropriate, the relationships we examine are estimated con-
the NAA membership guidelines were modified, see National Academy of Arbitrators, Member-
ship Guidelines, available at http://www.naarb.org/member_guidelines.html.  Further, we did not
control for the arbitrator’s education because doing so violated the “parallel regression” assump-
tion of ordinal logistic regression (OLR) analysis, which is subsequently discussed.  However, we
did control for the arbitrator’s occupation, which is highly correlated with education.
8 Nels E. Nelson & Earl M. Curry. Arbitrator Characteristics and Arbitral Decisions, 20 IND.
REL. 312, 312–17 (1981); Jack Stieber, Richard N. Block & Leslie F. Corbitt, How Representative
Are Published Arbitration Decisions?, in ARBITRATION 1984: ABSENTEEISM, RECENT LAW,
PANELS, AND PUBLISHED PAPERS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 172–92 (W. J. Gershenfeld, ed., 1985); Nels E.
Nelson, The Selection of Arbitrators, 37(10) LAB. L.J. 703–11 (1986); Allen Ponak, Discharge
Arbitration and Reinstatement in the Province of Alberta, 42 ARB. J. 39–46 (1987); Brian Bem-
mels, The Effect of Grievants’ Gender on Arbitrators’ Decisions, 41(2) INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
251–62 (1988); Brian Bemmels, Arbitrator Characteristics and Arbitrator Decisions, 11(2) J. LAB.
RES. 181–92 (1990); Brian Bemmels, Attribution Theory and Discipline Arbitration, 44(33) IN-
DUS. & LAB. REL. REV 548–62 (1991); Clarence R. Deitsch & David A. Dilts, An Analysis of
Arbitrator Characteristics and their Effects on Decision Making in Discharge Cases, LAB. L.J.
112–16 (Feb. 1989); Robert J. Thorton & Perry A. Zirkel, The Consistency and Predictability of
Grievance Arbitration Awards, 43(2) INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV 294–306 (1990); Perry A. Zirkel
& Philip H. Breslin, Correlates of Grievance Arbitration Awards, 24(1) JOURNAL OF COLLECTIVE
NEGOTIATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 45–54 (1995); Nels E. Nelson & A.N.M. Meshquat Ud-
din, The Impact of Delay on Arbitrators’ Decisions in Discharge Cases, 23(2) LAB. STUD. J. 3–20
(1998); Laura J. Cooper, Mario F. Bognanno & Stephen F. Befort, How and Why Labor Arbitra-
tors Decide Discipline and Discharge Cases, in ARBITRATION 2007: WORKPLACE JUSTICE FOR A
CHANGING ENVIRONMENT, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTIETH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 420–59 (S.F. Befort & P. Halter, eds., 2008).
9 Ken Jennings & R. Wolters, Discharge Cases Reconsidered, 31(3) ARB. J. 164–180 (1976);
Richard N. Block & Jack Steiber, The Impact of Attorneys and Arbitrators on Arbitration
Awards, 40(4) INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV 543–55 (1987); Ponak, supra note 8; Clyde Scott &
Elizabeth Shaodan, The Effect of Gender on Arbitration Decisions, 10 J. LAB. RES 429–36
(1989); Zirkel & Breslin, supra note 8; Nelson & Uddin, supra note 8; Cooper, Bognanno, &
Befort, supra note 8.
10 Block & Steiber, supra note 9; Ponak, supra note 8; Bemmels, supra note 8; David A. Dilts
& Edwin C. Leonard, Jr., Win-Loss Rates in Public Sector Grievance Arbitration Cases: Implica-
tions for the Selection of Arbitrators, 18 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOT. 337–44 (1989); Kenneth W.
Thornicroft, Arbitrators and Substance Abuse Discharge Cases: An Empirical Assessment, LAB.
STUD. J. 40 (1989); Debra Mesch, Grievance Arbitration in the Public Sector: A Conceptual
Framework and Empirical Analysis of Public and Private Sector Arbitration Cases, 15 REV. PUB.
PER ADMIN. 22–36 (1995); Zirkel & Breslin, supra note 8; Nelson & Uddin, supra note 8;
Cooper, Bognanno, & Befort, supra note 8.
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ditional on these variables’ effects.  Further, to our knowledge, we
uniquely include in our controls whether the grievant was charged
with a crime for the same conduct that formed the basis for the
employer’s discharge action.
III. CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
A. Discharge Award Outcomes
1. Utilization of Daugherty’s Seven Tests of Just Cause
The disciplinary clause in most collective bargaining agree-
ments does not define the term “just cause.”  Rather, it leaves this
task to arbitrators, legal scholars, and commentators.  However, it
is reported that no definition of just cause is more widely recog-
nized and accepted than that first articulated nearly fifty years ago
by Carroll Daugherty in his 1964 and 1966 awards, Grief Bros.
Cooperage Corp and Enterprise Wire awards, respectively.11  In
their book, Just Cause: The Seven Tests, Koven and Smith
observed:
The basic elements of just cause which different arbitrators have
emphasized have been reduced by Arbitrator Carroll R. Daugh-
erty to seven tests.  These tests, in the form of questions, re-
present the most specifically articulated analysis of the just
cause standard as well as an extremely practical approach.  The
comprehensiveness of these tests, their utility, and the wide-
spread acceptance they have received . . . led us to structure this
book around them (emphasis added).12
It has been further stated that Daugherty’s definition is widely
used in materials designed for the training of arbitrators and labor
arbitration advocates.13  Similarly, the NAA’s Common Law of the
Workplace described Daugherty’s definition as “undeniably influ-
ential.”14  Daugherty’s Seven Tests are posed as seven questions,
11 Enterprise Wheel Co., 46 LA 359; Donald S. McPherson, The Evolving Concept of Just
Cause: Carroll R. Daugherty and the Requirement of Disciplinary Due Process, 38 LAB. L.J.
387–403 (1987).
12 KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 5, at 23.
13 John E. Dunsford, Arbitral Decisions: The Tests of Just Cause, in ARBITRATION 1989: THE
ARBITRATOR’S DISCRETION DURING AND AFTER THE HEARING, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-
SECOND ANNUAL MEETINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 23–50 (G. W.
Gruenberg, ed., 1990).
14 THEODORE J. ST. ANTOINE, THE COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE: THE VIEWS OF AR-
BITRATORS 202 (2d ed. 2005).
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whereby a “no” answer to any one question “. . . normally signifies
that just and proper cause does not exist.”15  In paraphrased form,
Daugherty’s seven questions are:
1. Was the grievant forewarned of the consequences for vio-
lating the rule/order?
2. Was the rule/order germane to the orderly, efficient, and
safe operation of the business?
3. Was the alleged rule/order violation investigated prior to
issuing discipline?
4. Was the employer’s investigation conducted fairly and
objectively?
5. Did the investigating “judge” find substantial evidence of
employee guilt, as charged?
6. Does the employer apply its rule/penalties evenhandedly
and without discrimination?
7. Was the level of meted out discipline reasonably related to
the seriousness of the employee’s proven offense and to the
record of the employee’s service?16
We did not measure whether a single “no” answer to any one
of these seven questions resulted in decisions that the employee’s
discharge lacked just cause, as required by Daugherty’s description
of the common law of just cause.  However, we did measure
whether the rubric of the Seven Tests, as a unified defining formu-
lation of the meaning of just cause, explicitly manifested itself in
each award in our sample.  To be clear, we coded whether the arbi-
trator followed Daugherty’s rubric and not whether some of the
inquiries posed by the Seven Tests were, individually, relevant to
the arbitrator’s decision, as they surely would be.17
The literature assumes that Daugherty’s rubric enjoys “wide-
spread acceptance” and is “undeniably influential,” which, to us,
seems to reasonably infer that his rubric is manifest in a majority of
discharge awards and is utilized by a majority of the arbitrators
15 Grief Bros., 42 LA 555, 557–59 (Carroll R. Daugherty, 1964).
16 Id.
17 See David A. Dilts & James S. Moore, Do Arbitrators Use Just Cause Standards in Decid-
ing Discharge and Discipline Cases? A Test, 30 J. LAB. RES., 245–261 (2009).  This study applied
“machine learning” analysis to 256 discharge and discipline awards that were published in 2003
and 2004 by the Bureau of National Affairs.  The study concluded that a common law of just
cause was manifest in these awards because the arbitrators who decided them applied some or
all of Daugherty’s standards in the vast majority of the sampled awards, and, consequently, that
their decisions were generally fair and consistent.  However, this study did not examine whether
a “single ‘no’ answer” to any one of Daugherty’s seven questions resulted in a finding of no just
cause.  Thus, whether the study’s arbitrators strictly adhered to Daugherty’s prescription of a
common law of just cause is unknown.
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who issue these awards.  With data about whether arbitrators as-
sessed just cause by using the Seven Tests, the present study is per-
haps the first with data about the proportion of discharge awards
and the proportion of their deciding arbitrators that are premised
on the Seven Tests: information that can be used to test these infer-
ences.  Based on this construction of conventional wisdom, these
twin inferences are combined to form the following postulate:
Hypothesis 1A: A significant proportion of all discharge awards is-
sued per arbitrator utilized Daugherty’s rubric.
The next proposition stems from the inference that an arbitra-
tor’s mere use of Daugherty’s rubric could result in a more rigor-
ous evaluation of the evidence proffered by the employer at the
just cause discharge hearing.  Thus, arbitral analysis of record evi-
dence based on Daugherty’s seven evidentiary hurdles would pre-
sumably leave little room for employer error in its quest to prove
just cause for discharging an employee.  Statistically speaking,
holding employers to Daugherty’s predefined tests should reduce
the probability of employer success.  Therefore, the probability
that the employer’s discharge action will be upheld should be lower
when arbitrators use Daugherty’s Seven Tests than when the rubric
is not called upon by the arbitrator.  Accordingly, we also propose:
Hypothesis 1B: If the arbitrator utilized Daugherty’s rubric to ana-
lyze the case record then the probability that the employer’s dis-
charge action will be upheld is reduced.
2. Quantum of Proof
A doctrine that has almost universal acceptance in disciplinary
arbitration is that the employer bears the burden of proving just
cause.  Less widely accepted is the quantum of evidence that
should be required in just cause arbitrations.18  Nevertheless, as St.
Antoine has suggested, the conventional wisdom is that “most” ar-
bitrators embrace the lowest quantum standard, “preponderance
of evidence,” in deciding just cause grievances.19  As in civil law,
the preponderance quantum requires that the evidence presented
by one party is more persuasive than that which is presented by the
other party, on balance.  It also asserts that a “minority” of arbitra-
18 MARVIN HILL, JR. & ANTHONY V. SINICROPI, EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATION (1980); KOVEN
& SMITH, supra note 5; ST. ANTOINE, supra note 14.
19 ST. ANTOINE, supra note 14, at 191.
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tors are said to use the intermediate standard, “clear and convinc-
ing evidence.”  However, when the alleged workplace offense
involves a crime or moral turpitude (i.e., an offense that resulted in
the employee having been charged with a crime or an offense in-
volving, for example, dishonesty, off-the-job misconduct, violence
and aggression, or drugs and alcohol), the conventional wisdom is
that “most” arbitrators require clear and convincing evidence,
while “some” arbitrators require the highest standard, “beyond a
reasonable doubt.”  Typical of criminal litigation, this standard re-
quires the evidence of one party to be far superior to that of the
other party.20
Given the conventional wisdom based on St. Antoine’s assess-
ment, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2A: “Most” arbitrators require the employer to prove its
just cause discharge claim by a preponderance of evidence.
Hypothesis 2B: A “minority” of arbitrators requires the employer to
prove its just cause discharge claim by clear and convincing
evidence.
Hypothesis 2C: When the employee’s workplace offense involves a
crime or moral turpitude, “most” arbitrators require the em-
ployer to prove its just cause discharge claim by clear and con-
vincing evidence, while “some” arbitrators require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
In addition to these generalizations, it can be logically inferred
that as arbitrators hold employers to a more stringent quantum of
proof, the probability that the employer will succeed in proving its
just cause claim will decrease.  As Dilts and Deitsch put it, the “in-
herent risk of failure for the party making and proving a claim”
increases when more stringent quantum standards are applied.21
Therefore, when clear and convincing evidence and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt are expected of the employer, the chances that
the employer’s discharge action will be sustained will likely dimin-
ish.  Thus, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2D: The probability that the employer’s discharge action
will be upheld decreases when arbitrators require more strin-
20 ST. ANTOINE, supra note 14, at 192.
21 Dilts & Deitsch, supra note 16, at 43–44.
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gent quantum standards (i.e., clear and convincing evidence and
proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
3. Last Chance Agreements
A “last chance agreement” is a contract signed by the em-
ployer and the union, and/or the employee, in which the employer
agrees to reinstate a discharged employee with the understanding
that said reinstatement is the employee’s last chance at behavioral
modification and to work up to expectations.  Last chance agree-
ments often grant the employer the expressed discretion to dis-
charge the employee for a subsequent offense, and, further, the
agreement may expressly state or be interpreted that any subse-
quent disciplinary sanction cannot be arbitrated.
If an employee is discharged for violating a last chance agree-
ment and the discharge is challenged in arbitration, the employer’s
burden is generally lighter, since the employer only needs to prove
(1) that the alleged offense occurred and (2) that there was no rea-
sonable basis for its occurrence.22  This lighter burden supplants
the more demanding standard of “just cause” when the discharged
employee was on a last chance agreement at the time of discharge.
For these reasons, conventional wisdom holds that a majority of
arbitrators would enforce the discharge penalty, “if the actions or
conduct by the employee is found to violate the last-chance agree-
ment”.23  Similarly, The Common Law of the Workplace states:
“An arbitrator must abide by the terms of a last-chance agreement
fairly negotiated between an employer, an employee, and (where
applicable) the union representing the employee.”24  These gener-
alizations are recast to form the following:
Hypothesis 3: The probability that the arbitrator will uphold the em-
ployer’s discharge action increases if the discharged grievant
was on a last chance agreement at the time.
22 KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 5; Donald S. McPherson & Burt R. Metzger, “Last Chance”
Discharges at Arbitration: Emergent Standards of Judicial Review, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FORTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETINGS OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION
315–23 (P. B. Voos, ed.) (Industrial Relations Research Association 1994); Donald J. Peterson,
Last Chance Agreements, 52 DISP. RES. J. 37–43 (1997); BRAND, supra note 5; ELKOURI &
ELKOURI, supra note 5; ST. ANTOINE, supra note 14.
23 ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 5, at 973.
24 ST. ANTOINE, supra note 14, at 173.
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4. Grievant’s Job Tenure
The common law of “just cause,” among other things, entitles
the employee to due process, equal protection, and specific mitigat-
ing considerations, such as the employee’s work record and good
faith intentions.  In addition, arbitral jurisprudence treats an em-
ployee’s length of service with the employer—a dimension of the
employee’s work record—as a mitigating factor that arbitrators
consider when evaluating the appropriateness of the employer’s
discipline.  For instance, Elkouri and Elkouri, How Arbitration
Works asserts that “long service with a company, particularly if un-
blemished, is a definite factor in favor of the employee whose dis-
charge is reviewed through arbitration.”25 The Common Law of
the Workplace states that “an employee’s seniority” is a specific
mitigating factor.26
The rationale underlying this belief is that loyal, long-term em-
ployees have more to lose when discharged than do their short-
term co-workers, and, therefore, the former merits favorable dif-
ferential treatment.  Accordingly, the expectation is that the em-
ployer’s decision to discharge is less likely to be sustained when the
employee’s length of service is long.  However, conventional wis-
dom usually expresses this hypothesis in conditional terms, evaluat-
ing the employee’s length of service, while simultaneously
considering other employee work record dimensions, such as job
performance, the egregiousness of the employee’s instant offense,
whether the employee’s record includes previous offenses, and
whether the grievant was under a last chance agreement, or
charged with a crime.  Along with tenure, these job performance
and discipline dimensions comprise “the record of the employee’s
service,” as this phrase is used in Daugherty’s question number
seven, and collectively serve as a basis for mitigating the discharge
penalty, and, thus, affect the arbitrator’s discharge decision.
Grievant tenure effects on discharge outcomes, to our knowl-
edge, have been examined only once before, and that investigation
may have limitations.  Nelson and Uddin found that the probability
of a discharged employee’s reinstatement significantly increases
with seniority.27 However, in regard to the employee’s work record
dimensions, these scholars only controlled for the employee’s of-
fense type.  Therefore, their significant tenure finding may be due
to uncontrolled aspects of the employee’s work record.  In addition
25 ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 5, at 988.
26 ST. ANTOINE, supra note 14, at 160.
27 Nelson & Uddin, supra note 8.
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to controlling for the employee’s offense type, our examination of
tenure effects also takes into account whether the grievant was
working under a last chance agreement and whether the grievant
was charged with a crime for the same conduct that resulted in the
discharge.  However, like Nelson and Uddin, we were unable to
control for the effects that the employee’s job performance and
record of previous offenses may have had on the arbitrator’s dis-
charge award.  Thus, these limitations could bias our estimated par-
tial relationships between the discharge arbitration outcomes and
the employee’s tenure.  Nevertheless, based on the forgoing, the
conventional wisdom in question can be expressed as follows:
Hypothesis 4: The probability that the employer’s discharge action
will be upheld decreases as the length of the employee’s tenure
increases.
B. Discharge Award Remedies
1. Jurisdiction and Back Pay Reductions
From our sample of discharge decisions, we evaluated a sub-
sample of awards in which the arbitrator overturned the em-
ployer’s discharge decision, and, as a remedy, ordered that the
grievant’s employment be reinstated with either partial or full back
pay.  Using this data, we examined two additional generalized be-
liefs about specific remedial provisions that arbitrators presumably
include in their awards.  To our knowledge, neither of the following
propositions has previously been tested.
Post-award disputes between labor and management can arise
over the amount of back pay payable to reinstated employees.  To
mitigate this reality, arbitrators are believed to take two affirma-
tive steps.  First, arbitrators presumably retain post-award jurisdic-
tion over these cases to supervise the enforcement of their back
pay orders, and, specifically, to determine any dispute that may
arise over the amount of back pay due to the employee.  When
arbitrators fail to retain post-award jurisdiction, disputes of this na-
ture can either result in litigation, where the court is asked to en-
force the arbitration’s reinstatement/back pay award, or in
arbitration, where the matter of “amount due” is remanded to the
arbitrator of record for determination, or where it is heard de novo
by a different arbitrator.
Second, to be fair and to ensure that their monetary remedies
are not perceived as windfalls, it is commonly thought that arbitra-
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tors are careful to reduce their ordered back pay: (1) by the
amount of interim wages that the reinstated employee may have
earned at another job, and/or by the amount of public unemploy-
ment compensation payments that the employee may have re-
ceived during the discharge period; and (2) by an equivalent
amount of wages that could have been earned, but were not be-
cause the grievant failed to look for work, or did not accept an
equivalent job offer during the discharge period.  Illustrations of
these aspects of conventional wisdom are set forth in self-explana-
tory quotes from The Common Law of the Workplace:
Jurisdiction
Once it is determined that a back pay award is appropriate, an
arbitrator may remand the task of computation to the parties.
Such a remedy is usually, but not always, accompanied by reten-
tion of jurisdiction by the arbitrator in the event that there is a
subsequent dispute over the amount (emphasis added);28
Reduction in Back Pay
With few exceptions, arbitrators, like the courts and the NLRB,
will deduct actual interim earnings and willfully incurred losses
from an order of back pay . . . Failure by the employee to search
for alternative work or a refusal to accept substantially
equivalent employment will result in a corresponding reduction
in a back pay award (emphasis added).29
Based on these assertions, we formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5: Arbitrators “usually” retain jurisdiction when back
pay is awarded to the reinstated grievant.
Hypothesis 6: Arbitrators, “with few exceptions,” will deduct actual
interim earnings and willfully incurred losses from orders to re-
instate the discharged grievant with back pay.
28 ST. ANTOINE, supra note 14, at 374.
29 ST. ANTOINE, supra note 14, at 376.
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IV. METHOD
A. Data and Variables
We coded 1432 discharge awards that were issued between
1982 and 2005 by seventy-four arbitrators.  All of these awards
were filed with the Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services
(BMS), and each involved a Minnesota public or private sector
bargaining unit.  By agency rule, the arbitrators on the BMS roster
of arbitrators are required to submit all of the awards that they
issue involving Minnesota work sites, regardless of the source of
appointment or selection (e.g., BMS, FMCS, or the American Ar-
bitration Association).  The only exception to this rule is that a pri-
vate sector party may refuse to permit the release of an award.30
Accordingly, our sample is a rough approximation of the popula-
tion of discharge awards rendered in Minnesota during the sam-
pling period.31  We coded thirty-six different aspects of every
discharge award filed with the BMS during the sampling period
and merged these data with generally available biographical infor-
mation about the deciding arbitrators.  Due to coding complexities,
we omitted discharge awards that involved multiple grievants.
From this information, we created arbitrator, grievant, and ar-
bitration case characteristic control variables, as previously identi-
fied in the literature, the conventional wisdom and inference
variables of principal interest herein, and the ordered categorical
dependent variable—discharge award outcome—that is used in
30 Minnesota Rules, Chapter 5530.08, subpart 9, requires arbitrators to file their public and
private sector awards with the BMS. Specifically, the rule states: “Unless one or both private
sector parties have specifically requested that an award not be provided to the commissioner,
arbitrators shall submit copies of all awards involving Minnesota work sites to the commissioner
regardless of the source of appointment or selection. Awards filed with the commissioner are
public documents.”
31 Primarily, because we are unaware of any national survey of discharge awards, or, for that
matter, any field study based on a sample from the “population” of discharge awards, there is no
objective basis for assessing whether the Minnesota sample is representative of all discharge
awards issued nationally.  Mindful of these facts, see Phillip H. Breslin and Perry A. Zirkel,
Arbitrator Impartiality and the Burden of Proof, 44(6) LAB. L.J. 381–84 (1993). Breslin & Zirkel
surveyed 166 Bureau of National Affairs and Commerce Clearing House discharge awards that
were published in 1986.  Based on these awards, they reported a management win, union win,
and split award distribution of 51.2%, 12%, and 36.7%, respectively.  The distribution of our
1432 discharge awards across these three outcome categories is 52.4%, 19.8%, and 27.8%.  The
two distributions are relatively similar; however, our dataset is larger and includes both pub-
lished and unpublished awards; the compared study is based on published awards, which are not
represented as being representative.
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our models of arbitrator decision making. Specifically, each
award’s outcome was coded as a one to four consecutive integer.
We arbitrarily assigned a one to the employer’s “best” award out-
come (i.e., when the arbitrator denied the grievance, finding just
cause for the employer’s discharge action); two to the employer’s
“next best” award outcome (i.e., when the arbitrator modified the
employer’s discharge action, reinstating the grievant without back
pay); three to the employer’s “near worst” award outcome (i.e.,
when the arbitrator modified the employer’s action, reinstating the
grievant with partial back pay); four to the employer’s “worst”
award outcome (i.e., when the arbitrator upheld the grievance,
reinstating the grievant with full back pay).  Table 1 presents defi-
nitions of the study’s variables.
TABLE 1. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Dependent Variable
Discharge Award 1-arbitrator denied the grievance, finding just cause for the employer’s
Outcome discharge action; 2-arbitrator modified the employer’s discharge action by
reinstating the grievant without back pay; 3-arbitrator modified the
employer’s discharge action by reinstating the grievant with partial back
pay; and 4-arbitrator upheld the grievance and ordered the reinstatement
of the grievant with full back pay.
Independent Variables
Conventional Wisdom Variables:
Seven Tests A categorical variable equal to 1 if the arbitrator utilized Daugherty’s
Seven Tests, 0 otherwise.
Quantum A categorical variable equal to 1 if the arbitrator specified preponderance
of evidence as the standard, 0 otherwise; 1 if the arbitrator specified clear
and convincing evidence as the standard, 0 otherwise; 1 if the arbitrator
specified beyond a reasonable doubt as the standard, 0 otherwise.  The
omitted group includes awards where the arbitrator did not specify the
quantum of proof standard that was required to determine the matter.
Last Chance A dummy variable equal to 1 if the grievant was working under the terms
of a “last chance agreement” at the time of discharge, 0 otherwise.
Tenure A categorical variable equal to 1 if the grievant had worked for the
employer for less than a year, 0 otherwise; from 1 to less than 5 years, 0
otherwise; from 5 to less than 10 years, 0 otherwise; from 10 to less than 20
years, 0 otherwise; for an unknown number of years, 0 otherwise.  The
omitted group includes awards where the grievant worked for the
employer for 20 or more years.
Jurisdictiona If the arbitrator reinstated the grievant with partial or full back pay: a
categorical variable equal to 1 if the arbitrator retained jurisdiction to
decide subsequent disputes between the parties with regard to remedy, 0
otherwise.
Reductiona If the arbitrator reinstated the grievant with partial or full back pay: a
categorical variable equal to 1 if the arbitrator’s award states that the
amount of back pay is to be reduced by the employee’s interim earnings or
the employee’s failure to mitigate by seeking employment, 0 otherwise.
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TABLE 1. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS (CONTINUED)
Control Variables
Arbitrator Characteristics:
Gender A dummy variable equal to 1if the arbitrator is female, 0 otherwise.
Age A continuous variable indicating the arbitrator’s age at the time the award
was issued.
Experience A dummy variable equal to 1 if the arbitrator was a member of the NAA
–(NAA) at the time that the award was issued, 0 otherwise.
Occupation A categorical variable equal to 1 if the arbitrator was neither employed as
an attorney or academic, 0 otherwise; 1 if the arbitrator was employed as
an attorney, 0 otherwise; 1 if the arbitrator was employed as an academic,
0 otherwise; 1 if the arbitrator was both employed as an attorney and
academic, 0 otherwise.
Grievant Characteristics:
Gender A dummy variable equal to 1 if the grievant is female, 0 otherwise.
Gender Match A dummy variable equal to 1 if the gender of the arbitrator and grievant
are the same, 0 otherwise.
Arbitration Case Characteristics:
Sector A dummy variable equal to 1 if the grievant worked in the private sector,
0 otherwise.
Attorney A categorical variable equal to 1 if only the union was represented by an
Representation attorney, 0 otherwise; equal to 1 if only the employer was represented by
an attorney, 0 otherwise; equal to 1 if both the union and the employer
were represented by an attorney, 0 otherwise.  The omitted group includes
awards where an attorney represented neither the union nor the
employer.
Delay A continuous variable that measures the number of days between the date
of the alleged offense and the date the arbitration award was issued.
Crime A dummy variable equal to 1 if the grievant was charged with a crime for
the same conduct that formed the basis for the employer’s disciplinary
actions, 0 otherwise.
Alleged Offense A categorical variable equal to 1 if the alleged offense involved violence
and aggression, 0 otherwise; equal to 1 if the alleged offense involved
attendance, 0 otherwise; equal to 1 if the alleged offense involved
dishonesty, 0 otherwise; equal to 1 if the alleged offense involved drugs or
alcohol, 0 otherwise; equal to 1 if the alleged offense involved on-the-job
misconduct, 0 otherwise; equal to 1 if the alleged offense involved off-the-
job misconduct, 0 otherwise; equal to 1 if the alleged offense involved
insubordination, 0 otherwise; equal to 1 if the alleged offense involved job
performance, 0 otherwise.  The omitted group includes awards for all
other types of alleged offenses.
Year A categorical variable equal to 1 if the arbitrator’s award was issued in a
given year; 0 otherwise. Twenty-three dummy variables are used to control
for year effects.  The omitted year is 1983.  To conserve space, this
variable’s estimated coefficients are not reported.
Arbitrator A categorical variable equal to 1, if a given arbitrator issued the award, 0
otherwise.  Seventy-three dummy variables are used to control for
arbitrator effects. An unidentified arbitrator is omitted.  To conserve
space, this variable’s estimated coefficients are not reported.
a Jurisdiction and Reduction are determined from a sub-sample of the discharge awards that
include reinstatement decisions with full or partial back pay (i.e., 432 cases out of the 1432
cases in the sample). Therefore, Jurisdiction and Reduction were not included in the full
sample OLR analyses.
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B. Models
A generalized form of our model of discharge arbitration out-
come determinants can be expressed as Oit = f(CWit ⏐ Ait, Git, Cit,
m, n) + eit, where Oit is the ith discharge award’s outcome in time
period t.  CWit (short for “Conventional Wisdom”) is our set of
principal exogenous influences on Oit, which are conditional on the
effects of Ait, Git, Cit, m and n. Ait, Git, and Cit denote our set of
arbitrator, grievant, and arbitration case characteristic control vari-
ables, and m and n are year and arbitrator specific effects, respec-
tively; e is a random error term.  Our basic Model 1 ignores m and
n.  Next, we expanded Model 1 to include m dummy variables that
control for unmeasured and unobserved effects on arbitral decision
making that are correlated with each year in our sampling period
(Model 2).  Finally, we again expanded our models to include n
dummy variables controlling for fixed arbitrator effects (Model 3).
C. Analytical Approach
Since our dependent variable is comprised of four inherently
ordered categories, we utilized ordinal logistic regression (OLR) to
estimate our models and to test hypotheses that predict arbitral
discharge outcomes.  Utilization of OLR is premised on the “paral-
lel regression” or “proportional odds” assumption that the coeffi-
cient estimates across ordinal outcome categories are equivalent,
thus obviating the need to estimate separate models for each cate-
gory of the dependent variable.32  A Brant test was used to assess
this assumption.  As reported in Table 3, the Brant test result was
insignificant (i.e., c2(68)=79.79, p=.09), implying that the parallel
regression assumption was not violated.33
Our Stata 12 OLR results are also reported in Table 3.  With
the one through four coding of our dependent variable, a signifi-
cantly positive OLR coefficient is interpreted to mean that an in-
crease in CWit value will increase the probability of higher-number
32 SCOTT J. LONG & JEREMY FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT
VARIABLES USING STATA (2006).
33 LONG & FREESE, supra note 31; Jerry Hausman & Daniel L. McFadden, Specification
Tests for the Multinomial Logit Model, in 52(5) ECONOMETRICA 1219–240 (1984); Rory Wolfe &
William Gould, An Approximate Likelihood-Ratio Test for Ordinal Response Models, in 7(42)
STATA TECH. BULLETIN 24–27 (1998); JEFFREY WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF
CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA (2002).
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Oit outcomes, favoring the grievant/union.  Conversely, a signifi-
cantly negative coefficient means that an increase in CWit value will
increase in probability of lower-number Oit response outcomes,
favoring the employer.  To further facilitate the interpretation of
the OLR coefficient estimates, we calculated their corresponding
marginal effects (Table 4), which are defined as the percentage
change in the probability of a specific award outcome in response
to a discrete 0-to-1 change in a dichotomous CWit variable, all
other variables held constant at mean values.  To conserve space,
we only present the marginal effects in Table 4 corresponding to
the CWit estimates in Model 3, Table 3.
For the hypotheses that require examining whether observed
proportions from our sample are aligned with hypothetical propor-
tions, as prescribed by conventional arbitration wisdom and related
inferences, we used two-tailed binomial tests.  We also utilized Wil-
son’s confidence intervals (CI) to account for sampling error for a
given sample proportion.  If the expected proportion falls within
the interval determined by the observed sample proportion and
significance level desired, then the observed and expected propor-
tions are assumed to be similar.
V. RESULTS
A. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents the study’s variable means, standard devia-
tions, and number of observations.  The discharge outcome varia-
ble has a mean value of 1.97, which means that the discharge
awards rendered by arbitrators tend to favor outcomes that em-
ployers prefer.  Table 2’s footnote shows that arbitrators sustained
the employer’s discharge actions in 52.4% of cases, while uphold-
ing the grievance in only 19.8% of cases.  The remaining share of
discharge awards ordered the grievant’s reinstatement without
back pay (17.4%) and with partial back pay (10.4%).
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TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Standard
Mean Deviation N
Dependent Variable:
Discharge Outcomea 1.97 1.19 1432
Conventional Wisdom Variables:
Seven Tests:
Arbitrator utilizeD 0.09 0.29 135
Quantum:
Preponderance of the evidence standard 0.10 0.30 142
Clear and convincing standard 0.12 0.33 174
Beyond a reasonable doubt standard 0.02 0.14 29
No specific standard (omitted group) 0.76 0.43 1087
Last Chance:
Grievant on a last chance agreement 0.11 0.32 162
Tenure:
< 1 Year of service 0.05 0.23 78
1-5 Years of service 0.25 0.43 359
5-10 Years of service 0.23 0.42 330
10-20 Years of service 0.24 0.43 344
Unknown years of service 0.11 0.32 162
 20+ Years of service (omitted group) 0.11 0.31 159
Jurisdiction:
Arbitrator retains jurisdiction to decide
subsequent disputes 0.27 0.44 115b
Reduction:
Arbitrator reduces back pay 0.47 0.50 204b
Control Variables:
Arbitrator Characteristics:
Gender 0.17 0.37 241
Age at time award issued 57.27 9.65 1432
NAA member 0.54 0.50 772
Occupation:
Employed as an attorney 0.40 0.49 570
Employed as an academic 0.33 0.47 472
Employed as both an attorney and an
academic 0.01 0.11 18
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TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (CONTINUED)
Neither employed as an attorney or an
academic (omitted group) 0.26 0.44 372
Grievant Characteristics:
Gender 0.24 0.43 349
Gender Match 0.68 0.47 978
Arbitration Case Characteristics:
Sector 0.51 0.50 727
Attorney Representation:
Union only representation 0.09 0.28 126
Employer only representation 0.26 0.44 367
Both parties represented 0.46 0.50 655
Parties not represented (omitted group) 0.20 0.40 284
Delay 275.23 174.40 1432
Crime 0.06 0.24 91
Alleged Offense:
Violence and Aggression 0.17 0.38 245
Attendance 0.19 0.39 267
Dishonesty 0.19 0.39 269
Drugs and Alcohol 0.05 0.21 69
On-the-Job Misconduct 0.05 0.21 68
Off-the-Job Misconduct 0.04 0.19 56
Insubordination 0.12 0.32 169
Performance 0.19 0.40 277
Other (omitted group) 0.01 0.09 12
N = 1432
a Discharge outcomes: 1 - 52.4% (N=750); 2 - 17.4% (N=249); 3 - 10.4% (N=149); 4 - 19.8%
(N=284)
b In contrast to the other descriptive statistics, Jurisdiction and Reduction come from a sub-
sample of 432 reinstatement cases with full or partial back pay.
B. OLR Model Significance and Variance Estimation
All three of the OLR c2s in Table 3 are p<.01, suggesting that
our models are statistically significant.  Also, it is noteworthy that
the c2 and pseudo-R2 estimates exhibit inter-model stepwise in-
creases in magnitude.  This can be interpreted to mean that the
year-specific effects in Model 2 and the year and arbitrator specific
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effects in Model 3 are capturing important award outcome influ-
ences.  For example, after arbitrator specific effects are taken into
account, the pseudo-R2 in Table 3 increased by 43% from .053 in
Model 2 to .076 in Model 3.  Hence, explaining arbitrators’ dis-
charge outcomes may partly depend on the specific arbitrator who
decided the case.
TABLE 3. DISCHARGE AWARDS: ORDERED LOGIT ESTIMATES
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Conventional Wisdom Variables:
Seven Tests:
Arbitrator utilized -0.150 -0.176 -0.172
(0.189) (0.193) (0.233)
Quantum:
Preponderance of the evidence standard 0.362 ** 0.355 * 0.399 *
(0.180) (0.185) (0.204)
Clear and convincing standard 0.714 *** 0.751 *** 0.795 ***
(0.160) (0.163) (0.190)
Beyond a reasonable doubt standard 0.832 ** 0.868 ** 0.822 **
(0.375) (0.382) (0.403)
Last Chance:
Grievant under last chance agreement -0.890 *** -0.911 *** -0.965 ***
(0.190) (0.193) (0.202)
Tenure:
< 1 Year of service -0.268 -0.245 -0.289
(0.272) (0.276) (0.288)
1-5 Years of service -0.232 -0.193 -0.251
(0.190) (0.194) (0.204)
5-10 Years of service 0.093 0.130 0.090
(0.189) (0.195) (0.203)
10-20 Years of service -0.332 * -0.326 * -0.380 *
(0.189) (0.193) (0.202)
Unknown years of service -0.061 0.031 0.056
(0.228) (0.233) (0.250)
Control Variables:
Arbitrator Gender 0.081 0.084
(0.175) (0.179)
Arbitrator Age 0.009 0.010 0.051
(0.006) (0.006) (0.037)
Arbitrator was a NAA Member -0.343 *** -0.349 *** -0.273
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TABLE 3. DISCHARGE AWARDS: ORDERED LOGIT ESTIMATES
(CONTINUED)
(0.113) (0.120) (0.218)
Occupation:
Attorney 0.539 *** 0.538 ***
(0.143) (0.146)
Academic 0.347 ** 0.324 **
(0.145) (0.148)
Both attorney and academic 0.361 0.261
(0.457) (0.465)
Gender of Grievant 0.163 0.131 0.065
(0.160) (0.162) (0.171)
Arbitrator/Grievant Gender Match 0.031 -0.010 -0.018
(0.159) (0.160) (0.168)
Private Sector Employer 0.252 ** 0.215 * 0.133
(0.112) (0.116) (0.126)
Attorney Representation:
Union only 0.309 0.298 0.242
(0.205) (0.209) (0.217)
Employer only -0.432 *** -0.450 *** -0.441 ***
(0.158) (0.160) (0.167)
Union and employer 0.062 0.070 0.065
(0.138) (0.142) (0.149)
Delay -0.0016 * -0.0016 * -0.0017 **
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Crime -0.519 * -0.477 * -0.452
(0.281) (0.285) (0.298)
Alleged Offense:
Violence and Aggression -1.015 -1.052 * -1.090 *
(0.631) (0.628) (0.653)
Attendance -0.989 -1.031 -0.997
(0.630) (0.627) (0.654)
Dishonesty -1.007 -1.120 * -1.072
(0.630) (0.628) (0.655)
Drugs or Alcohol -1.356 ** -1.451 ** -1.397 **
(0.670) (0.670) (0.700)
On-the-Job Misconduct -0.656 -0.726 -0.692
(0.657) (0.657) (0.683)
Off-the-Job Misconduct -0.321 -0.437 -0.480
(0.703) (0.704) (0.732)
Insubordination -0.594 -0.666 -0.706
(0.634) (0.633) (0.660)
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TABLE 3. DISCHARGE AWARDS: ORDERED LOGIT ESTIMATES
(CONTINUED)
Job Performance -1.426 ** -1.466 ** -1.537 **
(0.632) (0.629) (0.655)
Year Effects No Yes Yes
Arbitrator Effects No No Yes
Log pseudo likelihood -1641.29 -1624.80 -1586.66
N 1432 1432 1432
c2 150.08 *** 183.05 *** 259.32 ***
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.053 0.076
Brant c2 79.79
p=0.09
P < .01***, p < .05**, p < .10*; Two-tailed tests
1. Daugherty’s Seven Tests
9.4%, or 135, of our 1432 discharge awards evidenced the ac-
tual utilization of Daugherty’s rubric, and 32.4%, or twenty-four, of
the sample’s seventy-four arbitrators did so in at least one of their
decisions.  Therefore, the average caseload using the Seven Tests’
system was 7.5% (SD=.18) across all arbitrators under study.
We interpret expressions like “widespread acceptance” and
“undeniably influential” with reference to Daugherty Seven Tests
to mean that at least 50% of all discharge awards issued per arbi-
trator utilized this analytical system.  However, the binomial test
showed a significant difference at p<.001 between the sample’s
7.5% proportion and the hypothetical proportion of 50%.  The ex-
pected .50 also did not fall within Wilson’s confidence interval
(CI95=.062, .090).  These results, therefore, do not support Hypoth-
esis 1A.
In addition, the estimated OLR coefficients in Table 3 show
that the effect of arbitrators following Daugherty’s rubric on award
outcomes was insignificant at p<.05.  Thus, Hypothesis 1B is also
not supported.  We further discerned the arbitrators’ decisions in
these Seven Tests cases and found that, contrary to expectation, the
arbitrators in seventy-seven out of the 135 cases using Daugherty’s
rubric (or 57%) upheld the employer’s discharge actions.
2. Quantum of Proof
9.9%, or 142, of 1432 discharge awards actually stated that
preponderance was the quantum standard applied, and 52.7%, or
thirty-nine, of seventy-four arbitrators explicitly expressed the ap-
plication of the preponderance quantum in at least one of their
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discharge decisions.  These thirty-nine arbitrators did so, on aver-
age, in 24.4% of the decisions that they issued.  Yet, across all sev-
enty-four arbitrators, the average caseload explicitly referencing
the preponderance standard was 12.8% (SD=.23) per arbitrator.
Substantively, this proportion of the current sample seems to con-
tradict the belief that “most” arbitrators require employers to
prove just cause claims by a preponderance of the evidence.  How-
ever, as we subsequently show, a more in-depth analysis appears to
support the opposite conclusion.
We begin this analysis by pointing out that 76%, or 1087, of
the dataset’s awards did not identify an applicable quantum stan-
dard (see Table 2).  Seemingly corroborating the above result,
Breslin and Zirkel found that 5.7%, or thirty-four of 601 arbitra-
tion awards of all types, mentioned a specific quantum of proof.34
However, while it appears common for most discharge awards to
not explicitly state a quantum standard, this does not necessarily
mean that the arbitrators who issued them did not have a deci-
sional standard in mind.
After all, the choice between the employer’s claim of a just
cause discharge and the union’s counter-claim requires some quan-
tum of proof, even if unstated.  Hence, for two reasons, we postu-
lated that when an award does not specify a quantum standard, the
arbitrator implicitly required preponderance.  First, conventional
wisdom holds that “most” arbitrators base their discharge decisions
on preponderance, and this received view may be correct.  Second,
preponderance is the quantum standard used in most civil (or con-
tract) lawsuits, and, given the similarity between civil cases and just
cause grievances, preponderance may be “understood” to be the
quantum standard used in arbitration, and, thus, perhaps, expressly
to state as much in the just cause award is a needless redundancy.
Continuing this reasoning, arbitrators may warrant it necessary
specifically to identify the required quantum standard only when
the decision requires a higher standard (e.g., clear and convincing
evidence and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
Our OLR estimations provide a way to test this postulate.
Note the “Preponderance of the evidence standard” coefficient in
Table 3, Model 3, is insignificantly different from the comparison
category, “No specific standard,” at the 5% level.  Therefore, the
effect on the arbitrator’s just cause decision is essentially the same
whether the award identifies preponderance as the applicable stan-
34 Breslin & Zirkel, supra note 30.
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dard, or is silent with respect to a specific standard.  To further test
this equivalency idea, we ran OLR analyses with preponderance
and “No specific standard” combined as the omitted group.  Both
clear and convincing (b=0.74, p<.001) and proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt (b=0.80, p<.05) coefficients remained significantly posi-
tive compared to this combined dichotomous variable.  This result
implies that preponderance is, perhaps, the quantum standard—
the “default” standard—that arbitrators require when the issued
award does not reference a specific quantum.
This finding invited a reevaluation of our preponderance data,
which showed that 86%, or 1232, of the sample’s 1432 discharge
awards either specified preponderance as the applicable standard,
or were silent regarding same (see Table 2).  97.3%, or seventy-two
of our seventy-four arbitrators, required preponderance, explicitly
or implicitly, in at least one decision.  Therefore, arbitrators, on av-
erage, required proof by a preponderance of evidence in 85.2% of
their respective discharge decisions (SD=.23).  Hence, if the quan-
tum of proof required by “most” arbitrators in just cause discharge
cases is preponderance, then one would expect it to be required in
at least a majority of the arbitrator’s discharge cases.  A binomial
test indicated that 85.2% is significantly different from 50% at
p<.001 and obviously surpasses the 50% hypothetical threshold, as
indicated by Wilson’s confidence interval (CI95=.833,.869).  Hence,
the evidence, based on the hypothetical 50% assumption and on
our more comprehensive analyses, tends to support Hypothesis
2A.
Next, regardless of the offense alleged, 12.2%, or 174, of the
discharge awards required employer proof of just cause by clear
and convincing evidence.  And, 45.9%, or thirty-four of seventy-
four arbitrators, required the clear and convincing standard at least
once.  Across all arbitrators, however, the average percentage of an
arbitrator’s respective caseload that required clear and convincing
evidence was 11.4% (SD=.21).  Conventional wisdom does not in-
dicate what the word “minority” might equate to.  For example, is
it 10%, 25%, or 49%?  If we selected 10% as the assumed “minor-
ity” and compared it to our 11.4% observed proportion, a binomial
test would suggest that we could not reject the null that the ob-
served and hypothetical proportions are similar (p=.09) to one an-
other.  Wilson’s confidence interval provided confirmation
(CI95=.098,.131).  If 25% or 49% was considered to be a “minor-
ity,” these proportions would be outside the confidence interval
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and significantly different than the observed proportion.  Accord-
ingly, there is support for Hypothesis 2B.
However, when the employee’s alleged offense involved crimi-
nal charges or moral turpitude, the conventional wisdom is that
“most” arbitrators require the employer to prove just cause by
clear and convincing evidence, and “some” require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.  45.3 % or 648, of the sample’s awards involved
allegations of moral turpitude or criminal charges, with 85.1 %, or
sixty-three of seventy-four arbitrators, deciding at least one crime
or moral turpitude case.  Across all of the arbitrators, the average
percentage of crime or moral turpitude cases in their respective
discharge portfolios was 49.5% per arbitrator (SD=.31).
Moreover, 15.1%, or ninety-eight of these more serious cases,
required clear and convincing proof of just cause.  Twenty-six arbi-
trators handled at least one of these ninety-eight cases (i.e., 41.3%
of the sixty-three arbitrators who decided crime/moral turpitude
cases or 35.1% of the sample’s seventy-four arbitrators).  Across
arbitrators, the average percentage of an arbitrator’s crime/moral
turpitude discharge caseload that used the clear and convincing
standard was 13.6% (SD=.25).  If “most” covers at least 50%, a
binomial test would suggest that the observed and hypothetical
proportions are significantly different at p<.001.  Additionally,
given Wilson’s confidence interval (CI95=.112,.164), the “most”
proposition of Hypothesis 2C is not supported.
Regarding the proposition that some of these serious cases
have arbitrators requiring evidence of just cause that is proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt, we find that this assumption may have
credence.  3.9% or twenty-five of the crime/moral turpitude cases,
required the employer to provide proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, and sixteen arbitrators decided at least one of these twenty-
five cases (i.e., 25.4% of the sixty-three arbitrators heard crime/
moral turpitude cases or 21.6% of the total arbitrator sample).  For
those hearing these serious cases, the average percentage of an ar-
bitrator’s respective crime/moral turpitude caseload was 5.9%
(SD=.13).  As previously stated, conventional wisdom is not spe-
cific about what “some” should mean.  Is it 10%, 25%, or less than
half?  A binomial test would suggest all three proportions would be
significantly different from the sample (p<.001).  Wilson’s confi-
dence interval illustrates that any three of these proposed percent-
ages would be outside the upper-limit of the interval
(CI95=.043,.079).  Thus, the “some” proposition of Hypothesis 2C
finds support.
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Additionally, we proposed that employers would find it more
difficult to prove just cause if their arbitrators required proof by
more stringent standards.  In Table 3, Model 3, the clear and con-
vincing (b=0.80, p<.001) and beyond a reasonable doubt (b=0.82,
p<.05) coefficients are significantly different from that of the com-
parison group.  A Wald-c2 test of the coefficients indicated that
both standards have similar effects on discharge decisions.  Table
4’s marginal effects further highlight that an arbitrator denying a
grievance decreases in probability by approximately 20% for these
more stringent standards, respectively.  These results, therefore,
provide support for Hypothesis 2D.
TABLE 4. DISCHARGE AWARDS:
MARGINAL EFFECTS FOR MODEL 3’S CONVENTIONAL
WISDOM COEFFICIENTS
Model 3
2 - 3 -
1 - Denied Reinstate Reinstate w/ 4 – Upheld
the w/o back partial back the
grievance pay pay grievance
Conventional Wisdom Variables:
Seven Tests:
Arbitrator utilized 0.043 -0.010 -0.010 -0.023
(0.057) (0.014) (0.014) (0.029)
Quantum of Proof:
Preponderance of the evidence -0.098 * 0.015 *** 0.023 ** 0.061 *standard
(0.050) (0.005) (0.012) (0.034)
Clear and convincing standard -0.195 *** 0.019 *** 0.043 *** 0.133 ***
(0.044) (0.004) (0.009) (0.037)
Beyond a reasonable doubt -0.199 ** 0.012 0.043 *** 0.144 *standard
(0.090) (0.010) (0.015) (0.085)
Last Chance:
Grievant under last chance 0.223 *** -0.066 *** -0.054 *** -0.103 ***agreement
(0.041) (0.016) (0.011) (0.017)
Tenure:
< 1 Year of service 0.071 -0.017 -0.017 -0.037
(0.069) (0.019) (0.017) (0.033)
1-5 Years of service 0.062 -0.014 -0.015 -0.033
(0.050) (0.012) (0.012) (0.026)
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TABLE 4. DISCHARGE AWARDS: MARGINAL EFFECTS FOR
MODEL 3’S CONVENTIONAL WISDOM COEFFICIENTS
(CONTINUED)
5-10 Years of service -0.022 0.004 0.005 0.013
(0.051) (0.010) (0.012) (0.029)
10-20 Years of service 0.094 * -0.022 * -0.023 * -0.049 **
(0.049) (0.013) (0.012) (0.025)
Unknown years of service -0.014 0.003 0.003 0.008
(0.062) (0.012) (0.015) (0.036)
Probability (Y = Outcome—X) 0.531 0.196 0.107 0.166
P<.01***, p<.05**, p<.10*; Two-tailed tests
3. Last Chance Agreements
Table 2 shows that 11%, or 162, of the awards involved an
employee who was working under the terms of a last chance agree-
ment at the time of discharge.  Further, the arbitrator sustained the
employer’s decision to terminate the grievant’s employment in
72.2%, or 117, of these awards.  The OLR analysis reveals the ro-
bustness of this descriptive relationship.  The last chance coeffi-
cients in Table 3 are significantly negative at p<.01.  This finding,
therefore, also supports Hypothesis 3.
Table 4’s marginal effect estimates for Model 3 show that the
probability that the discharged employee’s grievance will be denied
is expected to increase by 22.3% when the employee is on a last
chance agreement.  Correspondingly, the marginal effect estimates
show that the probability that the employee will be reinstated with-
out back pay, with partial back pay, or with full back pay is ex-
pected to decrease by 6.6%, 5.4%, and 10.3%, respectively.
4. Grievant’s Tenure
Table 2 shows that 53% of the grievants in the sample worked
fewer than ten years for their employers and that 35% had tenures
of more than ten years.  Yet, across the three models in Table 3, the
tenure categories, as compared to the twenty years or more senior-
ity category, are shown to have no significant effect on arbitrator
discharge decisions at p<.05 in the OLR analysis.  To ascertain the
robustness of these findings, we re-estimated the three models in
Table 3 after removing the 162 observations in our dataset for
which tenure information was not provided in the arbitrators’ deci-
sions.  The results were the same as the full sample.  Hence, our
results do not support Hypothesis 4.
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5. Remedies: Jurisdiction and Reduction in Back Pay
Reinstatement Decisions
Fifty-five of seventy-four arbitrators (74.3%) in our sample or-
dered back pay reinstatements at least once in 432 discharge
awards (30.2% of 1432 awards).  Among these fifty-five arbitrators,
thirty (or 54.5%; 40.5% of the seventy-four arbitrators) retained
jurisdiction at least once in 26.6% or 115 of 432 cases.  Across the
arbitrators who ordered back pay reinstatements, the average
caseload for which jurisdiction was retained is 22% (SD=.31) per
arbitrator.  If arbitrators “usually” retain jurisdiction as set forth in
this proposition then, hypothetically, they should have retained ju-
risdiction in at least 50% of the awards.  Using a binomial test, the
observed 22% is significantly different from the hypothetical 50%
proportion at p<.001.  Wilson’s confidence interval provided
further support that the observed proportion did not fit the “usu-
ally” criteria (CI95=.183, .261).  Therefore, Hypothesis 5 is not
supported.
Forty-four arbitrators, out of fifty-five, who ordered back pay
reinstatements also ordered the back pay to be reduced by interim
earnings and/or willful losses at least once in the sample (i.e., 80%
of fifty-five arbitrators, or 59.5% of the sample’s seventy-four arbi-
trators).  These forty-four arbitrators ordered back pay reduction
in 204 of the sample’s 432 back pay reinstatement awards (i.e.,
47.2%).  Across the arbitrators who ordered back pay reinstate-
ments, the average caseload wherein back pay reductions were or-
dered is 50.5% per arbitrator (SD=.38).  As with our jurisdiction
analysis, we assumed the referenced “few exceptions” phrase to
mean that back pay is reduced in at least 50% of these awards.  A
binomial test indicated that the null hypothesis could not be re-
jected that the observed proportion of back pay reduction in the
current sample is similar to the hypothetical proportion (p=0.89).
Wilson’s confidence interval supported this conclusion (CI95=.468,
.563).  However, if the “few exceptions” assumption would surpass
the interval’s upper-limit, then our sample’s observed proportion
would not fulfill the criteria.  This finding has provided some sup-
port to Hypothesis 6.  Yet, in the future, if conventional wisdom
provides parameters to discern “few exceptions” as greater than
56.3%, then, our data could only provide evidence that the propor-
tion of reinstatement awards with reduced back pay in the sample
is not significantly different from a little more than a majority of
these awards.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
Arbitration’s conventional wisdom identifies determinants of
arbitrated discharge decisions.  Yet, the literature generally has not
tested the merits of such beliefs.  To partially fill the gap in our
understanding of arbitration outcomes in just cause discharge
cases, we tested several such generalizations and related infer-
ences.  First, while Daugherty’s Seven Tests are explicated in
books, the focus of discussion at arbitration conferences, and a sub-
ject generally covered in arbitrator training programs, our research
does not support the notion that Daugherty’s rubric is “undeniably
influential” or enjoys “widespread acceptance” in arbitral just
cause decision making.  Our findings revealed that only 7.5% of
the discharge awards issued per arbitrator explicitly utilized
Daugherty’s criteria.  Further, an arbitrator’s use of the Seven Tests
was not found to decrease the probability of employer success.  To
better understand why this might be the case, we noticed in our
sample that almost three out of five cases using Daugherty’s rubric
actually had arbitrators upholding employer discharge actions.
Though more information is required, these findings commend
the need for a scholarly investigation of Dunsford’s hypothesis.35
According to Dunsford’s argument, even though arbitrators may
use Daugherty’s seven-part rubric, they do not necessarily limit
their decisional discretion to strictly adhering to, and, thus,
“mechanically” following Daugherty’s definition of just cause (i.e.,
determining the employer’s disciplinary action lacked just cause
merely because one of Daugherty’s seven questions was answered
in the negative).36  Indeed, our Seven Tests variable only captured
whether the arbitrator expressly drew upon Daugherty’s rubric.  It
did not measure whether a “no” answer to a single Daugherty cri-
terion was determinative of the matter.  Nevertheless, only through
35 Dunsford, supra note 13.
36 To illustrate, envision a hypothetical discharge case in which the employer proved by cred-
ible evidence that the discharged employee was guilty of a rule infraction (e.g., fighting on the
job)—affirming Daugherty question #5—and the union proved that the employer’s investigation
of the alleged rule infraction was flawed (e.g., the employer’s investigator harbored anti-em-
ployee animus)—negating Daugherty question #4.  With this scenario in mind, it seems reasona-
ble to conclude that some arbitrators might adhere to the strict application of Daugherty’s
common law rule, finding that the employer’s discipline action lacked just cause because ques-
tion #4 was answered in the negative; while other arbitrators might not be willing to limit their
decisional discretion by mechanically ruling against the employer.  Rather, they might reason
that the employee’s proven “guilt” of wrongdoing overrides the employer’s proven “due pro-
cess” flaw, and, thus, determine that the discharge in question was for just cause.
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future research will we learn the prevalence of Daugherty’s pre-
scription or Dunsford’s hypothesis.
Second, our analyses provided support for the proposition that
discharge decisions without a specific quantum stated and those
with “preponderance” explicitly stated have an indistinguishable
effect on the issued outcome.  This suggests that most arbitrators
may view the preponderance standard as the “default” quantum
that need not be articulated.  Thus, if preponderance is the implied
quantum, then preponderance was the standard required in 85.2%
of the typical arbitrator’s respective caseload—signaling that
“most” arbitrators hold employers at least to this standard, as con-
vention would have it.  Also, we determined that 11.4% of an arbi-
trator’s respective caseload held employers to the more stringent
quantum of clear and convincing evidence, a finding that is consis-
tent with the belief that a “minority” of arbitrators require a more
stringent standard.  Additionally, aligned with inferences from con-
ventional wisdom and the reflections of Dilts and Deitsch,37 we
found support from our regressions that the use of more stringent
quanta—clear and convincing and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt— significantly lowered the probability that employers’ dis-
charge actions would be upheld by about 20%.  Thus, unions gen-
erally may experience better outcomes when employers are held to
stricter quantum standards.
Conventional wisdom also suggests that “most” arbitrators re-
quire the employer to prove its just cause claim by clear and con-
vincing evidence when the employee’s alleged offense involved a
crime or moral turpitude, and that “some” arbitrators require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in such cases.  Our data showed
that clear and convincing evidence and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt were at times used—respectively, on average, in 13.6% and
5.9% of an arbitrator’s respective caseload related to crime and
moral turpitude discharges.  Therefore, arbitrators likely applied
the default quantum, preponderance, and did not require a more
stringent quantum even in these more serious cases.  This is inter-
esting because, in these cases where arbitrators arguably should
impose more stringent requirements, they are not doing so and ap-
pear to be treating them as “normal” or “routine.”  Our study is
one of the first to investigate quantum issues, but more scholarly
work is required to corroborate our initial findings and further ex-
plore these questions.
37 Dilts & Deitsch, supra note 16.
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Further, affirming conventional wisdom, we established that
arbitrators were far more likely to sustain the employer’s discharge
action when the grievant was on a last chance agreement.  In our
data, the base probability that the employer will prevail in dis-
charge arbitration is 53.1%.  However, according to our findings,
when the grievant is on a last chance agreement, the probability of
an employer victory increases by 22.3% to approximately 75%.
This evidence suggests that arbitrators tend to recognize that their
discretion is limited when the employer presents an enforceable
last chance agreement and credibly show that extenuating circum-
stances do not absolve the employee of the proven offense.  In
these instances, the union faces an uphill battle in mounting a suc-
cessful challenge.  Nevertheless, our data also revealed that about
one-quarter of last chance cases involved union-favorable out-
comes. One explanation for this variance is that some arbitrators
apply just cause standards even though the discharge arbitration
involved a last chance agreement.  We also suggest that this is a
fruitful area for future study.
Next, our research does not support the conventional wisdom
that an employee’s on-the-job seniority is a mitigating factor in dis-
charge arbitration determinations.  Thus, we were unable to con-
firm Nelson and Uddin’s previous findings that greater employee
tenure is predictive of grievant reinstatement.38  This inter-study
difference could be attributed to data differences.  In contrast to
Nelson and Uddin’s work, we utilized a more comprehensive set of
independent variables, which included some record of service
dimensions (e.g., whether the grievant was under last chance agree-
ments, the type of grievant offense, and whether the grievant’s con-
duct was linked to criminal charges) that the arbitrator may
simultaneously evaluate when appraising the effect of a grievant’s
tenure.  Additionally, our ordinal dependent variable provided,
perhaps, a richer operationalization compared to their dichoto-
mous variable.  Further, our tenure variable was categorical, rather
than continuous—the latter could exhibit greater variance that
could yield a significant finding.
While our study generally improved upon Nelson and Uddin’s
“record of service” variables, we were unable to control for other
important record of service aspects, such as job performance, or
details about previous service blemishes.  These exclusions could
have biased our tenure coefficient estimations.  Further, employers
may shy away from discharging long-term employees in anticipa-
38 Nelson & Uddin, supra note 8.
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tion of otherwise adverse discharge arbitration awards.  If so, our
sample omitted these potential discharge awards, and, thus, sub-
jected our tenure coefficient estimations to selectivity bias.  How-
ever, the large size of our sample is a hedge against this bias.
Indeed, at least 35% of the employees in our sample of discharge
awards had employment tenures of at least ten years.  Ultimately,
our discrepant results, as compared to Nelson and Uddin, set up a
debate over tenure’s effects on discharge outcomes.  More research
on the effects of grievant tenure is imperative to discern which side
of the debate has more consistent evidence.  If possible, such mod-
els should include further details on a grievant’s record of service
to ensure more accurate estimates.
Finally, we studied two hypotheses from conventional wisdom
that address the substantive content of an arbitrator’s discharge
“remedy.”  The general belief is that, when a discharged employee
is reinstated with back pay, arbitrators, “with few exceptions,” will
articulate in the award whether and by how much the amount of
back pay due to the employee is to be reduced.  Additionally, it is
generally thought that in these cases arbitrators will “usually” re-
tain jurisdiction over the case to be in a position to resolve post-
award issues that may arise over the amount of back pay to which
the grievant is entitled.
Regarding reductions from back pay awards, our data were
similar to a hypothesized proportion of at least one-half having
one’s back pay reduced.  Nevertheless, the phrase “with few excep-
tions” that appears in the quotation taken from St. Antoine may
not be consistent with our assumption.39 Our analysis of this aspect
of the conventional wisdom invites further study.
However, contradicting conventional wisdom, our results illus-
trated that when arbitrators direct the parties to determine the
amount of back pay that a reinstated grievant is due they do not
usually retain jurisdiction.  This finding has significant workplace
implications.  With retained jurisdiction, the arbitrator—relative to
alternative dispute resolution strategies, such as arbitration de
novo or civil litigation—can quickly and economically remedy any
post-award back pay dispute, and in doing so, promote a positive
labor relations climate.  Future studies need to explore whether
our finding holds across other data sets, and, if so, to examine why
larger numbers of arbitrators are not retaining jurisdictions.
39 ST. ANTOINE, supra note 14.
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In conclusion, our empirical results derive from an unusually
large and uniquely comprehensive dataset.  Yet, its geographic
scope is limited to Minnesota, which calls into question the degree
to which it is representative of the nation’s array of discharge
awards and the arbitrators who issued them.  However, our ability
to make judgments about representativeness is limited by the pau-
city of national baseline data.  A complete assessment of conven-
tional wisdom in labor arbitration requires future inquiries using
different datasets, variable measures, and research designs.  How-
ever, at this juncture, we conclude from the present study’s exami-
nation of orthodox ideas influencing arbitral decision making in
just cause discharge cases and remedies demonstrates that conven-
tional wisdom is likely part fact and part fiction.  Our research find-
ings are provisional, at best.  Given that the current study is an
introductory empirical study of its kind, additional research is
needed to confirm or reject our findings.
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